UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

V.

DZHOKHAR A. TSARNAEV, also
known as Jahar Tsarni,

Defendant.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE GEORGE A. O'TOOLE, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

## EXCERPT OF DAY FORTY-THREE OF JURY TRIAL PART I JURY INSTRUCTIONS BY THE COURT

John J. Moakley United States Courthouse
Courtroom No. 9
One Courthouse Way
Boston, Massachusetts 02210
Monday, April 6, 2015
9:59 a.m.

Marcia G. Patrisso, RMR, CRR
Official Court Reporter
John J. Moakley U.S. Courthouse
One Courthouse Way, Room 3510
Boston, Massachusetts 02210
(617) 737-8728

Mechanical Steno - Computer-Aided Transcript

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## PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: All rise for the Court and the jury.

(The Court and jury enter the courtroom at 9:59 a.m.)

THE CLERK: Be seated.

THE COURT: Good morning, counsel.

COUNSEL IN UNISON: Good morning.

THE COURT: Good morning, jurors.

THE JURORS: Good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: I have two major responsibilities in a trial such as this. The first is almost over, and that is to preside over the case and to make whatever procedural or evidentiary rulings are necessary in the course of the trial. And you've seen that we've been doing that. The other major responsibility is at this stage of the proceedings to give you what we call these instructions in the principles of law that pertain to the matters you've heard about and about which you will have to make some decisions. So I'm now going to give you these instructions about the law that applies to these matters.

You can think of this as sort of a short course in all the law you will need to know in order to decide the issues in the case. So you shouldn't have to resort to any other ideas that you might have from any other sources about what the law is or might be with respect to these issues, but take it that what I will tell you is a complete and accurate summary of the principles of law that are to be applied in the case. It is my

duty to set forth these principles fully and accurately without regard to any personal or private views I might have about the wisdom or prudence of these principles or whether there might be different or additional ones that could be applied, but rather to tell you what the law is with respect to these matters.

You have a similar duty to accept and faithfully apply these principles sensibly without any regard to any personal or private views you might have about the wisdom or prudence of these principles or whether there might be different or additional ones that could be applied. Instead, accept that these are the principles of law that apply to these matters, consider these instructions sensibly as a whole and apply them faithfully.

These instructions will be lengthy but we will give you a written copy of them for the jury room so that you may review them and be reminded of them any time you wish to look at them while you're deliberating.

I'm going to talk about two general areas, and I'm going to divide my time in doing it. First I'm going to talk about the principles that relate to the particular offenses or crimes that are charged by the indictment in this case. That is, I will tell you what the government is required to prove in order to convict the defendant of the charges that are made against him. After I've done that, the lawyers for each side

will have their opportunity to present their closing statements to you. I think it will be helpful to you in listening to the closing statements to have understood from me what the principles of law are that relate to the proof of the charges. After the lawyers' closing statements, I'll have some more to say to you about the manner in which you will think about the evidence, discuss it and make some judgments about it.

Because some of the offenses that are at issue in this case are rather involved, let me begin by giving you a bit of introduction to federal criminal law. Federal criminal law consists of laws enacted by Congress that define certain acts as criminal. In enacting a criminal statute, Congress specifies what act or acts constitute the particular crime. At a trial when it is shown by the evidence that a defendant has, in fact, committed the defined conduct, then the crime may be said to have been proven, and where it has not been shown by the evidence that the defendant committed the defined conduct, the crime has not been proven.

Typically, the language of a federal criminal statute follows a common pattern or formula that can be stated briefly this way: Whoever does such and such shall be punished. Let me give you a silly hypothetical example to illustrate the grammar of federal criminal statutes. The statute might say, hypothetically, "Whoever knowingly sells an item of apparel without providing a certificate of origin, shall be punished."

I deliberately use a silly example because I want you to focus on the structure of criminal statutes right now rather than the substance.

In seeking to determine whether someone has committed the hypothetical crime, we would look at what the evidence established that the person had done and whether the person had done those things outlined in the statute as necessary to constitute the offense. So in the example, there would be three things -- and we would refer to them as the elements of the offense -- three things that would have to be shown: The person knowingly sold an item of apparel without providing a certificate of origin.

If those three things or elements were established as facts, then the government would have proved the crime. If all three things, all three things, are not established by the evidence, that is, one or more of them has not been established, then the crime has not been proven.

Sometimes Congress wants to be sure that a particular term in a statute is understood in a particular way, and it may include a full or partial definition of that term; for example, in our illustration, the statute might say, "The term 'item of apparel' shall include any garment or thing worn as clothing or adornment, but shall not include hospital gowns." When Congress provides a specific definition, then that definition is what controls for the purpose of the statute. When Congress

does not provide a specific definition to the terms of the statute, the general rule is that words are to be understood in accordance with their ordinary and usual meaning.

Sometimes a criminal statute will provide for alternate ways in which the offense could be committed. To return to our example, the statute might say, "Whoever knowingly sells an item of apparel without providing a certificate of origin, or advertises for sale an item of apparel for which no certificate of origin has been provided, shall be punished."

In this formulation there are two ways the statute might be violated: First, it could be proved that a person knowingly sold an item of apparel without a certificate of origin; second, it could be proved that the person advertised for sale an item of apparel for which no certificate of origin had been given.

Proof of either alternative would suffice to constitute the crime. But in such a case because the verdict of the jury must always be unanimous as to the elements of the offense, it would be necessary for all the members of the jury to agree that one or the other version had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and to be unanimous about that.

Sometimes a federal criminal statute will contain what we call a "jurisdictional element." The federal government has those powers that are granted to it by the Constitution. The

federal government's power to enact a criminal statute is limited to those matters within its proper jurisdiction. For example, the Constitution grants the federal government power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, and consequently, the federal government can enact criminal laws that pertain to the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce.

But selling or advertising an item of apparel might or might not have interstate or foreign effect or impact. In order to govern particular conduct that may be either federal or non-federal, depending on the circumstances, Congress may prescribe what we call a "jurisdictional element" to bring the matter within federal jurisdiction; thus, the statute might say, as some federal statutes do, "Whoever sells in interstate commerce an item of apparel without a certificate of origin commits the offense." Tying it to the specific power to regulate is sometimes a necessary jurisdictional element of a crime.

So I use this oversimplified illustration because I want you to see the patterns that can occur in the statutes that are at issue in this case. And I hope it will help you to hear and understand the instructions about those particular statutes.

Before I get to the instructions about the particular statutes, there are some other general matters I want to address. As I mentioned in my preliminary instructions to you

at the beginning of this case, there are various ways in which a person can be criminally liable for an offense. The first is when the person has personally and directly performed the acts that constitute the offense. A person who has actually done the acts which constitute the offense is said to have personally committed what we call the "substantive offense."

To use our example, a person who personally sold an item of apparel without providing a certificate of origin would be said to have directly committed the substantive offense.

A person who has not personally done all of the acts that constitute the crime may still be criminally responsible, however. One circumstance in which this may be true is if the person has aided or abetted another to commit the crime. A person may be found guilty of a federal offense if he aids or abets another person in committing that offense. In most of the counts in the indictment, the defendant is charged with aiding and abetting another person, namely, Tamerlan Tsarnaev, to commit a substantive offense.

To "aid or abet" means intentionally to help someone else commit the offense. To establish aiding and abetting, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, first, that someone else committed the charged crime; second, that the defendant consciously shared the other person's knowledge of the underlying criminal act intended to help him, and willfully took some part in the criminal endeavor seeking to help it

succeed.

An act is done willfully if it is done voluntarily and intentionally.

A person who aids and abets another to commit a crime need not be present when the underlying criminal act is performed or be aware of all the details of its commission to be guilty of aiding and abetting, but a general suspicion that an unlawful act may occur or that something criminal is happening is not enough.

Mere presence at the scene of a crime and knowledge that a crime is being committed are also not sufficient to establish aiding and abetting. To be guilty of aiding and abetting, a person must act in some way to affirmatively assist another person to commit a crime.

In every count where the defendant is charged both as a principal actor and as an aider or abetter, you may find him guilty if you unanimously conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he was either a principal or an aider or abetter or both. You need not be unanimous as to whether he was a principal as opposed to an aider or abetter, but to find him guilty each of you must conclude that he was one or the other or both.

It can also be a crime to conspire or agree with one or more other persons to work together to commit a substantive offense. This is the crime of conspiracy. When proven, conspiracy to commit an offense is a separate crime from the

substantive crime. The objective of the conspiracy might be to commit the substantive crime.

In our illustration, two or more people could agree or conspire together to sell an item of apparel without a required certificate of origin. That would be a separate crime from the act of selling.

In this case, three counts of the indictment present allegations of the crime of conspiracy in various forms under various statutes. In each of those counts the conspiracy is alleged to have had as its object the commission of certain identified substantive crimes. Specifically, the defendant is charged in Counts 1, 6 and 11 of conspiring with Tamerlan Tsarnaev to commit certain federal crimes.

A criminal conspiracy is an agreement to achieve an unlawful end or a lawful end by unlawful means. The agreement can be spoken or unspoken. It does not have to be a formal agreement which the people involved have actually sat down together and worked out all the details, although that might be the case.

To prove a criminal conspiracy, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that those who are involved shared an understanding of the unlawful nature of the crime they were agreeing to commit. Mere similarity of conduct among people or the fact they may have been associated with each other, and even discussed common aims in interest, does not

necessarily establish proof of the existence of a conspiracy although, of course, you may consider those factors.

Each of the three conspiracy counts charges the defendant with conspiring to commit a different federal crime; accordingly, you must consider each of those conspiracy counts separately. You may find the defendant guilty on any particular conspiracy count only if you unanimously conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant conspired with another to commit the federal crime charged in that particular count and not some other crime.

Count One charges the defendant with conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction. For you to find the defendant guilty of that charge, you must unanimously find that the government has proved the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the defendant and another agreed to use a weapon of mass destruction; and, second, that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined in the agreement intending that the crime of using a weapon of mass destruction be committed.

Count Six charges the defendant with conspiracy to bomb a place of public use. For you to find the defendant guilty of that charge, you must unanimously find the government has proved the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the defendant agreed with another to bomb a place of public use; and, second, that the defendant knowingly

and voluntarily joined in that agreement intending that the crime of bombing a place of public use be committed.

Count Eleven charges the defendant with conspiracy to maliciously destroy property. For you to find the defendant guilty of that charge, you must unanimously find the government has proved the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: That the defendant agreed with another to maliciously destroy property; and, second, the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined in that agreement intending that the crime of malicious destruction of property be committed.

The government must prove both the defendant intended to join the agreement and that the underlying crime be committed. The government does not have to prove that a defendant knew all the details of the conspiracy, that he participated in every act of the agreement, or that he played any particular role. It only needs to prove that the defendant knew of and joined in the agreement with the intent that its unlawful purpose be achieved.

A defendant's intent and knowledge can be proved with either direct or circumstantial evidence, including inferences from the surrounding facts and circumstances, such as the acts done by the defendant that furthered or advanced a conspiracy's objective.

A person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy but may happen to act in a way somehow to further the objective of the

conspiracy does not become a coconspirator. He must knowingly and intentionally join in the agreement with the purpose and intention to do something unlawful.

For the crime of conspiracy, the government does not have to prove that the conspiracy succeeded or that its objective was achieved. The crime of conspiracy is complete when the conspirators form their agreement to commit the underlying offense.

Each of the three conspiracy counts in this indictment also alleges a third element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt; namely, that the charged conspiracy resulted in the death of a person named in the respective count of the indictment. The government has alleged in these counts that each of the charged conspiracies resulted in the death of four people: Krystle Marie Campbell, Officer Sean Collier, Lingzi Lu, and Martin Richard.

For you to find that a charged conspiracy resulted in death, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the charged conspiracy resulted in the death of at least one of those people. You should consider each alleged death separately, and your determination of which death, if any, resulted from the charged conspiracy must be a unanimous one.

A death results from a charged crime if the death would not have occurred if the crime had not been committed.

In addition to the three counts in the indictment that

charged the defendant with conspiracy, there are 27 counts that charged the defendant with committing substantive offenses. In all of those substantive counts, the defendant is charged both as a principal and as an aider and abetter. And I've instructed you as to what must be proved to prove him guilty as an aider and abetter.

Additionally, a person may be found guilty of a substantive crime by his having been a coconspirator with another person who in furtherance of the conspiracy commits a crime that is within the scope of the conspiracy; in other words, a defendant who is found to have knowingly joined in a conspiracy may be held responsible for criminal acts committed by his fellow conspirators.

Any member of a conspiracy who commits a crime during the existence or life of the conspiracy in order to further or advance the objectives of the conspiracy is, in effect, acting as an agent for all the other members of the conspiracy, doing what they all expect to be done to achieve the results they've agreed to pursue. That person's illegal activity may therefore be attributed to the other coconspirators even if they have not directly participated in their fellow conspirators' illegal act.

You may find the defendant guilty of the substantive crime as charged in the indictment, even if he did not personally commit or participate in the actual commission of

the crime, if you are convinced that the crime was committed by a coconspirator of the defendant acting in furtherance of the conspiracy. For instance, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty as a member of the conspiracy charged in Count One, which is conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction resulting in death, then you may, although you're certainly not required to, find the defendant guilty of the substantive crime that was committed by a coconspirator who was working to accomplish the objective of the conspiracy.

To find the defendant guilty under this theory, you must be convinced of five things beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that the defendant was guilty of being a conspirator in the unlawful conspiracy; second, that another member of the conspiracy committed the substantive crime, say, use of a weapon of mass destruction resulting in death as charged in the particular count; third, that that coconspirator who committed the crime did so in furtherance of the work of the conspiracy; fourth, that the defendant was at that time still an active member of the conspiracy and had not withdrawn from participating in it.

Sometimes people may join in a conspiracy and then later leave or abandon the agreement. If that should happen, the person is no longer responsible for what is done thereafter by coconspirators.

And finally, the final element is that the defendant could reasonably have foreseen that his coconspirator would have committed the substantive crime in furtherance of the conspiracy.

In sum, and the conditions are that the defendant has to be guilty of the conspiracy with somebody else; somebody else in the conspiracy committed the crime; the crime was committed in furtherance of the joint agreement to violate the law; that the defendant was then still an active participant in the conspiracy; and last, that the defendant could reasonably have foreseen that one of his coconspirators would have done what was done to commit the crime.

If you find all of those things beyond a reasonable doubt, then you may find one conspirator guilty both of the conspiracy under the relevant counts and of the substantive offenses committed by the coconspirator.

I will now explain the elements for each of the substantive counts. Each count of the indictment charges the defendant with having committed a separate offense. Each count and the evidence relating to it should be considered separately, and a separate verdict will be returned as to each count. Your verdict of guilty or not guilty of an offense charged in one count should not control your decision on any other count.

I'm going to group the counts by the nature of the

charge that is made because many of them repeat the same statutory basis for asserting the fact of the crime.

Counts Two, Four, Twenty-Three, Twenty-Five,
Twenty-Seven and Twenty-Nine charge the defendant with the
crime of using a weapon of mass destruction. As you've heard,
the defendant is charged in Count One with conspiracy to use a
weapon of mass destruction. He's also charged in six counts
with using a weapon of mass destruction and/or aiding and
abetting Tamerlan Tsarnaev's use of a weapon of mass
destruction. So these are the substantive offenses related to
the conspiracy that is charged in Count One.

To find the defendant guilty of the use of a weapon of mass destruction either by direct commission or as an aider and abetter, you must unanimously find the government has proved each of the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, the defendant knowingly used a weapon of mass destruction; second, that it was knowingly used against a person or against real or personal property within the United States; and, third, that such property was used in interstate or foreign commerce or in an activity that affects interstate or foreign commerce; or, alternatively, that the offense or the results of the offense affected interstate or foreign commerce.

So you'll see from that third element there's a jurisdictional element, as I previously described it, and it is pled in the alternative. There are two ways of proving the

third element, which is that property was used in interstate or foreign commerce or in an activity that affected it, or that the offense or its results affected interstate or foreign commerce. If you choose an alternative, you must be unanimous as to which you choose.

Some of the defined terms: A "weapon of mass destruction" for these purposes means a destructive device which is defined by statute as any explosive bomb. "Knowingly" in this context, as in others, means that the act was done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of a mistake or an accident. "Interstate commerce" means commerce between any point in a state and any point outside that state. It is only necessary the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime had some minimal effect on interstate commerce. It is not necessary to find the defendant knew or intended that his actions would affect interstate commerce.

Each of the six counts that charge the defendant with the use of a weapon of mass destruction relates to a different alleged destructive device.

Count Two charges the defendant used a weapon of mass destruction and/or aided and abetted the use of a weapon of mass destruction in front of Marathon Sports on April 15, 2013. The indictment and verdict form both refer to the bomb alleged as Pressure Cooker Bomb No. 1.

Count Two alleges an additional element the government

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt; namely, the offense resulted in the death of Krystle Marie Campbell.

Count Four charges the defendant used and/or aided and abetted the use of a weapon of mass destruction in front of the Forum restaurant on April 15, 2013. The indictment and verdict form refer to the bomb alleged as Pressure Cooker Bomb No. 2.

Count Four also alleges an additional element the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt; namely, that the offense resulted in the death of Lingzi Lu and/or Martin Richard.

For you to find the defendant guilty of the additional element, you must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense charged in Count Four resulted in the death of at least one of these two people, and you should consider each separately. Your determination of which death, if either, resulted from the offense must be unanimous.

Count Twenty-Three charges the defendant with use of a weapon of mass destruction and/or aiding and abetting the use of a weapon of mass destruction that is alleged to have exploded on Laurel Street on April 19th, 2013. The indictment and verdict form refer to the bomb alleged as Pressure Cooker Bomb No. 3.

Count Twenty-Five charges that the defendant used a weapon of mass destruction and/or aided and abetted the use of a weapon of mass destruction that is alleged to have exploded

on Laurel Street on April 19th, 2013. The indictment and verdict form refer to this bomb alleged as Pipe Bomb No. 1.

Count Twenty-Seven charges the defendant used a weapon of mass destruction and/or aided and abetted the use of a weapon of mass destruction that is alleged to have exploded on Laurel Street on April 19, 2013. The indictment and verdict form refer to the bomb alleged as Pipe Bomb No. 2.

Count Twenty-Nine alleges the defendant used a weapon of mass destruction and/or aided and abetted the use of a weapon of mass destruction on Laurel Street on April 19, 2013, that did not explode. The indictment and verdict form refer to the bomb alleged as Pipe Bomb No. 3.

Counts 3, 5, 24, 26, 28 and 30 charge the defendant with the crime of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. In addition to being charged with six counts of using a weapon of mass destruction as I've just summarized, the defendant is charged with six corresponding counts of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to that crime of violence. I will refer to these as the "use and carry counts."

The use and carry counts separately charge that the defendant used and carried a bomb, a pistol or both during and in relation to each charged offense of the use of a weapon of mass destruction.

Although the use and carry charges and the

corresponding use of a weapon of mass destruction charges involve some overlapping conduct, under the law they are two different crimes.

To find the defendant guilty as a principal of a count charging that he used or carried a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, you must unanimously find the government has proved the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, the defendant committed the underlying crime of violence specified in the count that you're considering; and, second, that the defendant knowingly used or carried a firearm -- the firearm specified in the particular count during and in relation to that underlying crime.

To find the defendant guilty of aiding and abetting the use and carrying of a firearm during and in relation to the crime of violence, you must unanimously find the government has proved the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, another person committed the underlying crime of violence specified in the count you're considering; that the person knowingly used or carried a firearm during and in relation to the commission of that underlying crime; third, the defendant facilitated either the use of the firearm or the commission of the underlying crime; and, fourth, that the defendant did so with the advance knowledge that the other person would commit the underlying crime and would use or carry a firearm during and in relation to it.

Again, to do something knowingly in this context means to do it voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake or accident.

A "firearm" in this context means any weapon which will or is designed to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. A pellet or BB gun is not a firearm under the relevant statute. A firearm includes a destructive device which in turn means any explosive bomb. To use a firearm means to employ the firearm actively, such as to brandish, display, strike with, fire or attempt to fire, or detonate or attempt to detonate. To carry a firearm means to move or transport the firearm on one's person or in a vehicle or a container. A firearm need not be immediately accessible.

The words "during" and "in relation to" are to be given their ordinary and usual meaning. At a minimum, it means the firearm must have had some purpose or effect with respect to the underlying crime of violence. If a firearm is present simply as a result of coincidence or accident, it cannot be said that it was used or carried in relation to the underlying crime of violence. A firearm must have facilitated or have had the potential to facilitate the underlying offense.

To have advance knowledge that another person will use or carry a firearm during and in relation to the crime of violence means knowledge at a time when the individual could have attempted to alter the plan or withdrawn from the

enterprise. Knowledge of the firearm may, but does not have to, exist before the underlying crime commences. It is sufficient if the knowledge is gained in the midst of the underlying crime as long as the individual continues to participate in the crime and has a realistic opportunity to withdraw after acquiring the necessary knowledge.

You may but are not required to infer that an individual had sufficient advance knowledge if you find the individual continued his participation in the crime after learning of the other person's possession of a firearm.

Most of the use and carry counts include additional elements as to which the government bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. For example, some counts charge that the firearm was brandished or that it was discharged or that it was a destructive device or that the defendant caused and/or aided another person in causing someone's death through the use of the firearm, and the killing was a murder. So I'll define some of those terms for you.

To brandish a firearm means to display all or part of the firearm or otherwise to make the presence of the firearm known to another person in order to intimidate that person regardless of whether the firearm was directly visible to the person. A destructive device, as I've told you, is any explosive bomb.

"Murder" in this context is the unlawful killing of a

human being with malice aforethought. "Malice aforethought" means an intent at the time of the killing willfully to take the life of a human being or an intent willfully to act in a callous and wanton disregard of the consequences to human life. Malice aforethought does not necessarily imply ill will, spite or a hatred toward the individual killed.

In determining whether a victim was unlawfully killed with malice aforethought, you should consider all the evidence concerning the facts and circumstances preceding, surrounding and following the killing which may shed light on the question of intent.

A willful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated killing is a murder. A killing committed in the perpetration of or an attempt to perpetrate any arson, robbery or other murder is a murder. A killing perpetrated from premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to affect the death of any human being other than the person who is killed is also a murder. Premeditation contemplates a temporal dimension which need only be an appreciable amount of time. This may vary from case to case. The key element is the fact of deliberation of second thought.

If in accordance with these instructions you find the defendant guilty of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a particular crime of violence or of aiding and abetting another to do so, you may also find the defendant also

aided and abetted that other person in causing someone's death through the use of the firearm even if the defendant did not personally use the firearm or encourage the killing.

To find this, you must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant was a willing participant in the underlying crime of violence, the defendant intended the killing take place, and that a co-participant caused the victim's death through the use of a firearm.

You may also find the defendant aided and abetted another in causing someone's death through the use of a firearm if you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that, A, the defendant was a willing participant in the underlying crime, the underlying crime of violence was an arson, robbery or murder, and a co-participant caused the victim's death through the use of a firearm.

Count Three charges the defendant knowingly used or carried a firearm during and in relation to the crime of violence that is charged in Count Two. You'll see that these several use and carry counts all relate to one of the substantive counts of the use of a weapon of mass destruction, as I've told you. So you'll see them paired: Three goes with two, Five with Four and so on.

So as to Count Three, the indictment and verdict form identify the firearm for the use counts as Pressure Cooker Bomb No. 1. The crime charged in Count Two, use of a weapon of mass

destruction, qualifies as a crime of violence.

In Count Three, the government also alleges additional elements that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: that the alleged firearm was discharged, that the alleged firearm was a destructive device, and that the defendant in the course of committing the offense charged in Count Three caused the death of Krystle Marie Campbell through the use of the firearm and the killing was a murder, or aided and abetted another in causing the death of Krystle Marie Campbell through the use of the firearm and the killing was a murder.

Count Five charges the defendant knowingly used or carried a firearm during and in relation to the crime charged in Count Four and/or aided and abetted another in doing so.

The indictment and verdict form identify the firearm for these counts as Pressure Cooker Bomb No. 2. The crime charged in Count Four qualifies as a crime of violence.

In Count Five, the government alleges three additional elements that it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: That the alleged firearm was discharged, that the alleged firearm was a destructive device, and that the defendant in the course of committing the offense charged in Count Five caused the death of Lingzi Lu and/or Martin Richard through the use of the firearm and the killing was a murder, and/or aided and abetted another in causing the death of Lingzi Lu and/or Martin Richard through the use of the firearm and the killing was a murder.

Your finding as to which death, if either, was caused through the use of the firearm must be unanimous.

Count Twenty-Four charges the defendant knowingly used or carried a firearm during and in relation to the crime charged in Count Twenty-Three and/or aided and abetted another in doing so. The crime charged in Count Twenty-Three qualifies as a crime of violence.

The indictment alleges that two firearms were used and/or carried during and in relation to the offense charged in Count Twenty-Three. They're identified in the indictment and the verdict form as Pressure Cooker Bomb No. 3, and a Ruger P95 9mm semiautomatic handgun. To find the defendant guilty of this use and carry charge, you must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used or carried at least one of the two alleged firearms during and in relation to the underlying crime of violence and/or aided and abetted another in doing so. You must be unanimous as to which if either of the two alleged firearms the defendant used or carried during and in relation to the underlying offense.

If you're unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Pressure Cooker Bomb No. 3 is a firearm and that the defendant used or carried it during and in relation to the crime charged in Count Twenty-Three, and/or aided and abetted another in doing so, you will then determine whether the government has proved either of the following two additional

elements beyond a reasonable doubt: that the alleged firearm was discharged or that the alleged firearm was a destructive device.

If you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Ruger P95 9mm semiautomatic handgun is a firearm, as I've defined the term for you, and the defendant used or carried it during and in relation to the crime charged in Count Twenty-Three, and/or aided and abetted another in doing so, you will then determine whether the government has also proved the following additional element beyond a reasonable doubt: that the firearm was discharged.

Count Twenty-Six charges the defendant knowingly used or carried a firearm during and in relation to the crime charged in Count Twenty-Five and/or aided or abetted another in doing so. The crime charged in Count Twenty-Five qualifies as a crime of violence.

The indictment alleges that two firearms were used and carried during and in relation to the offense charged in Count Twenty-Five. They're identified in the indictment on the verdict form as Pipe Bomb No. 1 and a Ruger P95 9mm semiautomatic handgun.

To find the defendant guilty, you must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used or carried at least one of these two alleged firearms during and in relation to the underlying crime of violence and/or aided

and abetted another in doing so. You must be unanimous as to which, if either, of the two alleged firearms the defendant used or carried during and in relation to the underlying crime of violence.

If you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that Pipe Bomb No. 1 is a firearm and the defendant used or carried it during and in relation to the crime charged in Count Twenty-Five, and/or aided and abetted another in doing so, you will then determine whether the government has proved either of the two following additional elements beyond a reasonable doubt: that the alleged firearm was discharged and that the alleged firearm was a destructive device.

If you unanimously conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the Ruger P95 9mm semiautomatic handgun is a firearm and the defendant used or carried it during and in relation to the crime charged in Count Twenty-Five, or aided and abetted another to do so, you will then determine whether the government has proved the following additional elements beyond a reasonable doubt: that the alleged firearm was discharged.

Count Twenty-Eight charges the defendant knowingly used or carried a firearm during and in relation to the crime charged in Count Twenty-Seven and/or aided and abetted another in doing so. The crime charged in Count Twenty-Seven qualifies as a crime of violence. The indictment alleges that two firearms were used and carried during and in relation to the

offense charged in Count Twenty-Seven. They're identified in the indictment and the verdict form as Pipe Bomb No. 2 and a Ruger P95 9mm semiautomatic handgun.

To find the defendant guilty, you must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used or carried at least one of these two alleged firearms during and in relation to the underlying crime of violence and/or aided and abetted another in doing so. You must be unanimous as to which, if either, of the two alleged firearms the defendant used or carried during and in relation to the underlying crime of violence.

If you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that Pipe Bomb No. 2 is a firearm and the defendant used or carried it during and in relation to the crime charged in Count Twenty-Seven, or aided and abetted another in doing so, you'll then determine whether the government has also proved either of the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: that the alleged firearm was discharged and that the alleged firearm was a destructive device.

If you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Ruger P95 9mm semiautomatic handgun is a firearm and the defendant used or carried it during and in relation to the crime charged in Count Twenty-Seven, and/or aided and abetted another in doing so, you will then determine whether the government has also proved the following additional element

beyond a reasonable doubt: that the alleged firearm was discharged.

Count Thirty charges the defendant knowingly used or carried a firearm during and in relation to the crime charged in Count Twenty-Nine or aided and abetted another in doing so. The crime charged in Count Twenty-Nine qualifies as a crime of violence. The indictment alleges that two firearms were used or carried during and in relation to the offense charged in Count Twenty-Nine. They're identified in the indictment and the verdict form as Pipe Bomb No. 3 and a Ruger P95 9mm semiautomatic handgun.

To find the defendant guilty of this count, you must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used or carried at least one of these two alleged firearms during and in relation to the underlying crime of violence and/or aided and abetted another to do so. You must be unanimous as to which, if either, of the two alleged firearms the defendant used or carried during and in relation to the underlying crime of violence.

If you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Pipe Bomb No. 3 is a firearm and the defendant used or carried it during and in relation to the underlying crime charged in Count Twenty-Nine, and/or aided and abetted another in doing so, you will then determine whether the government has also proved either of the following two additional elements

beyond a reasonable doubt: that the alleged firearm was brandished intentionally and that the alleged firearm was a destructive device.

If you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Ruger P95 9mm semiautomatic handgun is a firearm and the defendant used or carried it during and in relation to the crime charged in Count Twenty-Nine and/or aided and abetted another in doing so, you will determine whether the government has also proved the following additional element beyond a reasonable doubt: that the alleged firearm was discharged.

Counts Seven and Nine charge the defendant with the crime of bombing a place of public use. You'll recall that I have instructed you that Count Six charges the defendant with conspiracy to bomb a place of public use. Counts Seven and Nine charge the defendant with the substantive crime of bombing a place of public use and/or aiding and abetting another to do so.

To find the defendant guilty of the crime of bombing a place of public use, you must find that the government has proved each of the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, the defendant knowingly delivered, placed, discharged or detonated an explosive in, into or against a place of public use; second, that the defendant did so intending to cause death or serious bodily injury, or alternatively, that the defendant did so with the intent to

cause extensive destruction of such place when such destruction resulted -- where such destruction results in or is likely to result in major economic loss.

You need not find the government has proved both of these types of intent, but you must unanimously find the government has proved at least one of them beyond a reasonable doubt. The third element is that the offense took place in the United States, and the fourth element is that the offense was committed in an attempt to compel the United States to do or to abstain from doing any act.

A "place of public use" means those parts of any building, land, street or other location that are accessible or open to members of the public whether continuously, periodically or occasionally, and encompasses any commercial, business, cultural, historical, entertainment, recreational or similar place that is so accessible and open to the public.

"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which involves: A, a substantial risk of death; B, extreme physical pain; C, protracted and obvious disfigurement; or, D, protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty.

For these purposes, an explosive means gunpowders, powders used for blasting, blasting materials, fuses other than electric circuit breakers, detonators and any chemical compounds, chemical mixture or device that contains any

oxidizing or combustible units or other ingredients in such proportions, quantities or packing that ignition by fire or by detonation of the compound, mixture or device or any part thereof may cause an explosion in so far that it is designed or has the capability to cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial material damage.

Count Seven charges the defendant placed a bomb in front of Marathon Sports on Boylston Street in Boston causing extensive destruction to Marathon Sports and other places of public use and/or aided and abetted another in doing so. The indictment and verdict form refer to this alleged explosive as Pressure Cooker Bomb No. 1. In Count Seven, the government alleges an additional element that it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: that the offense resulted in the death of Krystle Marie Campbell.

Count Nine charges the defendant bombed a place of public use by placing a bomb in front of the Forum restaurant causing extensive destruction to the Forum restaurant and other places of public use and/or aided and abetted another in doing so. The indictment and verdict form refer to this alleged explosive as Pressure Cooker Bomb No. 2.

In Count Nine, the government alleges an additional element that it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt; namely, that the offense resulted in the death of Lingzi Lu and/or Martin Richard. For you to find the defendant guilty of this

additional element, you must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offense -- that the offense resulted in the death of at least one of these two people, and you should consider each separately. And your determination of which death, if either, resulted must be unanimous.

Counts Eight and Ten charge the defendant with the crime of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. We went through this with respect to the crime of violence of use of a weapon of mass destruction. Each of those counts was paired with a count of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to the crime of violence. This is similar with respect to the crimes charged in Counts Seven and Nine, is the bombing of a public place. Counts Eight and Ten allege use of and carrying a firearm during and in relation to those crimes.

So Count Eight charges the defendant knowingly used and/or carried a firearm during and in relation to the crime charged in Count Seven and/or aided and abetted another in doing so. The indictment and verdict form identify the bomb as Pressure Cooker Bomb No. 1. The crime charged in Count Seven qualifies as a crime of violence.

In Count Eight, the government also alleges three additional elements, each of which it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: that the alleged firearm was discharged,

that the alleged firearm was a destructive device, and that the defendant in the course of committing the offense charged in Count Eight caused the death of Krystle Marie Campbell through the use of the firearm and the killing was a murder, and/or aided and abetted another in causing the killing of Krystle Marie Campbell through the use of the firearm, and the killing was a murder.

Count Ten charges the defendant knowingly used or carried a firearm during and in relation to the crime charged in Count Nine and/or aided and betted another in doing so. The indictment and verdict form identify this bomb as Pressure Cooker Bomb No. 2. The crime charged in Count Nine is a crime of violence.

In Count Ten, the government also alleges three additional elements that it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: that the alleged firearm was discharged, that the alleged firearm was a destructive device, and that the defendant in the course of committing the offense charged in Count Ten caused the death of Lingzi Lu and/or Martin Richard through the use of the firearm and that the killing was a murder, and/or aided and abetted another in causing the death of Lingzi Lu and/or Martin Richard through the use of the firearm and the killing was a murder.

For you to find the defendant guilty of the last element, you must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt

that the charged offense resulted in the death of at least one of the two people identified. You should consider each separately, and your determination of which death, if either, resulted from the offense must be an unanimous one.

Counts Twelve and Fourteen charge the defendant with malicious destruction of property. I have already instructed you that Count Eleven charges the defendant with the conspiracy to maliciously destroy property. Counts Twelve and Fourteen charge the defendant with the substantive offense of malicious destruction of property.

To find the defendant guilty of the malicious destruction of property, you must find the government has proved each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, the defendant damaged or destroyed or attempted to damage or destroy by means of fire or an explosive any building, vehicle or other real or personal property; second, that the defendant did so maliciously; third, he did so by means of a fire or explosion; and, fourth, that the building, vehicle or other real or personal property was used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce.

Let me define some of those terms. I told you what "explosive" means. To act maliciously means to act intentionally or with deliberate disregard of the likelihood that damage or injury will result. Use in interstate or

foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce means current active employment for commercial purposes, not merely a passive passing or past connection to commerce. The property's function must affect interstate commerce.

Count Twelve charges the defendant placed an explosive bomb in the vicinity of Marathon Sports on Boylston Street in Boston resulting in a premature end to the Boston Marathon and damage to Marathon Sports and other business property, and/or aided and abetted another in doing so. The indictment and verdict form refer to this alleged explosive as Pressure Cooker Bomb No. 1.

In Count Twelve, the government alleges two other elements it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: that the defendant as a result of his conduct directly or proximally caused personal injury or created a substantial risk of injury to any person, and/or aided and abetted another in doing so; and, second, that the defendant as a result of his conduct directly or proximally caused the death of Krystle Marie Campbell and/or purposely aided and abetted another in doing so.

Count Fourteen charges the defendant placed a bomb in the vicinity of the Forum restaurant on Boylston Street in Boston resulting in a premature end to the Boston Marathon and damage to the Forum restaurant and other business property,

and/or aided and abetted another in doing so. The indictment and verdict form refer to this bomb as Pressure Cooker Bomb No. 2.

In Count Fourteen, the government also alleges two other elements it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: that the defendant as a result of his conduct directly or proximally caused personal injury or created a substantial risk of injury to any person and/or aided and abetted another in doing so, and the defendant as a result of his conduct directly or proximally caused the death of any person.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this additional element, you must find unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, through his conduct, directly or proximally caused the death of Lingzi Lu and/or Martin Richard. You should consider each separately, and your decision as to which, if either, death resulted from the defendant's conduct must be a unanimous one.

Counts Thirteen and Fifteen charge the defendant with using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to the crime of violence alleged in Counts Twelve and Fourteen. Count Thirteen charges the defendant knowingly used or carried a firearm during and in relation to the crime charged in Count Twelve and/or aided and abetted another in doing so. The indictment and verdict form identify this bomb as Pressure Cooker Bomb No. 1. The crime charged in Count Twelve is a

crime of violence.

In Count Thirteen, the government also alleges three additional elements it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: that the alleged firearm was discharged, that the alleged firearm was a destructive device, and that the defendant in the course of committing the offense charged in Count Thirteen caused the death of Krystle Marie Campbell through the use of the firearm, and the killing was a murder, and/or aided and abetted another in causing the death of Krystle Marie Campbell through the use of the firearm, and the killing was a murder.

Count Fifteen charges the defendant knowingly used or carried a firearm during and in relation to the crime of violence charged in Count Fourteen, and/or aided and abetted another in doing so. The indictment and verdict form identify this bomb as Pressure Cooker Bomb No. 2. The crime charged in Count Fourteen is a crime of violence.

In Count Fifteen, the government also alleges three additional elements it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: that the alleged firearm was discharged, that the alleged firearm was a destructive device, and that the defendant in the course of committing the offense charged in Count Fifteen caused the death of Lingzi Lu and/or Martin Richard through the use of the firearm, and the killing was a murder, and/or aided and abetted another in causing the death of Lingzi Lu and/or Martin Richard through use of the firearm, and the killing was

a murder.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this additional element, you must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant through his conduct directly or proximally caused the death of Lingzi Lu and/or Martin Richard. You should consider each separately, and your determination as to which, if either, was caused by -- either death was caused by the defendant, your decision must be a unanimous one.

Counts Sixteen, Seventeen and Eighteen charge the defendant with using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. Count Sixteen charges the defendant knowingly used or carried a firearm identified as a Ruger P95 9mm semiautomatic handgun during and in relation to the crime of conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction that is charged in Count One, and/or aided and abetted another in doing so. The crime charged in Count One qualifies as a crime of violence.

In Count Sixteen, the government also alleges two additional elements, each of which it must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: that the alleged firearm was discharged, and that the defendant caused the death of Officer Sean Collier through the use of the firearm, and the killing was murder, and/or that he aided and abetted another in causing the death of Officer Sean Collier through the use of the firearm, and the

killing was a murder.

Count 17 likewise charges the defendant knowingly used or carried a firearm identified as a Ruger P95 9mm semiautomatic handgun during and in relation to the crime of conspiracy to bomb a place of public use as charged in Count Six, and/or aided or abetted another in doing so. The crime charged in Count Six qualifies as a crime of violence.

Like Count Sixteen, Count Seventeen charges two additional elements the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: that the alleged firearm was discharged, and that the defendant caused the death of Officer Sean Collier through the use of the firearm, and the killing was a murder, and/or that he aided and abetted another in causing the death of Officer Sean Collier through the use of the firearm, and the killing was a murder.

Similarly, Count Eighteen charges the defendant knowingly used or carried a firearm identified as a Ruger P95 9mm semiautomatic handgun during and in relation to the crime of conspiracy to maliciously destroy property as alleged in Count Eleven, and/or aided and abetted another in doing so. The crime charged in Count Eleven is a crime of violence.

Like Counts Sixteen and Seventeen, Count Eighteen charges the additional elements that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: that the alleged firearm was discharged and that the defendant caused the death of Officer

Sean Collier through the use of the firearm and the killing was a murder, and/or that he aided and abetted another in causing the death of Officer Sean Collier through the use of the firearm and the killing was a murder.

My instructions I've already given regarding the elements of the crime of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence apply to these Counts Sixteen, Seventeen and Eighteen, as do my instructions regarding aiding and abetting. The meaning of the word "discharge" and the requirements for finding that the firearm caused the death of a person and the killing was a murder, all of those instructions apply to Counts Sixteen, Seventeen and Eighteen.

And I remind you, of course, that to find the defendant guilty of an offense, you must be unanimously convinced the government has proved each and every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

As I've previously described, there is another method by which you may evaluate whether the defendant is guilty under Counts Sixteen, Seventeen or Eighteen. If you find the defendant is guilty of one or more of the underlying conspiracies that are referred to in Count Sixteen, Seventeen and Eighteen, that is, the conspiracies alleged in Counts One, Six and Eleven, if you find the defendant guilty of those conspiracy charges, you may, but of course are not required to,

find him guilty of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to the crime of conspiracy of which you found him guilty provided you find beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements: First, the defendant was guilty of being a conspirator in the underlying unlawful conspiracy; second, that his coconspirator used or carried the firearm during and in relation to the conspiracy; third, the coconspirator did so in furtherance of the conspiracy; and, fourth, that the defendant was at the time still an active member of the conspiracy and had not withdrawn from it; and, fifth and finally, that the defendant could have reasonably foreseen that the coconspirator might use or carry the firearm during and in relation to the conspiracy.

If you find all five of those elements to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, especially the fifth which is important, the defendant's state of mind, then you may find the defendant guilty of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to the conspiracy even if he did not personally commit the acts constituting the crime of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to the underlying conspiracy. However, if you are not satisfied of the existence of any one of the five elements that I've outlined, then you may not find the defendant guilty under this theory.

The same holds true for the additional element that is charged in Counts Sixteen, Seventeen and Eighteen, namely, that

the defendant through the use of the firearm caused the death of Officer Sean Collier; that is, you may, but are not required to, find the defendant guilty of that element if you unanimously conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant joined the underlying conspiracy charged in each count, that a coconspirator used and carried the firearm during and in relation to the underlying conspiracy, that the firearm was used to cause the murder of Officer Collier, the killing was in furtherance of the conspiracy, and the defendant was a member of the conspiracy at the time the killing occurred, and the killing was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.

Count Nineteen charges the defendant with carjacking, specifically alleges the defendant carjacked a Mercedes SUV from Dun Meng and/or aided and abetted another in doing so. For you to find the defendant guilty of carjacking, you must unanimously conclude that the government has proved the following four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, the defendant took a motor vehicle from Dun Meng; second, the defendant took the motor vehicle through the use of force, violence or intimidation; third, the defendant intended to cause death or serious bodily harm at the time he took the motor vehicle; and fourth, that the motor vehicle was transported, shipped or received in interstate or foreign commerce.

A person who takes a motor vehicle from the person or

presence of another acts with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm if the person intends to seriously harm or kill the driver, if necessary, to steal the car. You may infer, although you are not required to do so, that a person acted with such intent if he demanded the car at gunpoint or used verbal threats. You may also infer, although you're not required to do so, the person acted with such intent if he willfully and knowingly participated in the initiation of the carjacking knowing that another intended to demand the car at gunpoint.

As to Count Nineteen, the government also alleges and must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the carjacking resulted in the serious bodily injury to Officer Richard Donohue. "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that involves a substantial risk of death or extreme physical pain or protracted and obvious disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty. Injury may be said to have resulted from a carjacking even if it did not result from the taking of the car so long as it was caused by the carjacker while he still retained the car.

Count Twenty charges the defendant with the crime of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to the crime of violence that is charged in Count Nineteen, that is carjacking. Specifically, Count Twenty charges the defendant knowingly used or carried a firearm identified as a Ruger P95

9mm semiautomatic handgun during and in relation to the crime of carjacking that is charged in Count Nineteen, and/or aided and abetted another in doing so. The crime charged in Count Nineteen qualifies as a crime of violence.

The instructions I previously gave you with respect to using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence apply with equal force to this count.

With respect to Count Twenty, the government seeks to prove an additional element beyond a reasonable doubt, namely, that the firearm was brandished. My previous instruction about the definition of "brandished" applies here.

Count Twenty-One charges the defendant with robbery affecting interstate commerce. Specifically, Count Twenty-One charges the defendant committed a robbery affecting interstate commerce by withdrawing \$800 from Dun Meng's bank account on April 18, 2013, at an ATM in Watertown, and/or aided and abetted another in doing so. To find the person guilty of this charge, you must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the government has proved the following elements: First, that the defendant knowingly and willfully took property from Dun Meng; second, that he did so by robbery; third, that the robbery affected interstate commerce.

To act willfully in this context is to act voluntarily and intelligently with the specific intent that the underlying -- that the crime be committed, that is, with a bad

purpose either to disobey or disregard the law and not by accident, ignorance or mistake.

Robbery in this context means unlawfully taking or obtaining personal property from another against his or her will by means of actual or threatened force or violence or fear of injury to the person or property or to property in his custody or possession.

It is only necessary the government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a realistic probability that the acts committed by the defendant as charged in the indictment had some minimal effect on interstate commerce. It is not necessary for you to find the defendant knew or intended that his actions would affect interstate commerce.

Count Twenty-Two charges the defendant with using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in this case, the crime of robbery affecting interstate commerce that is charged in Count Twenty-One, or aiding and abetting another in doing so. The crime charged in Count Twenty-One, the robbery, is a crime of violence. I've previously instructed you the elements of the crime of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, and those apply here as well.

With respect to Count Twenty-Two, the government seeks to prove an additional element beyond a reasonable doubt; namely, that the firearm was brandished. And I've previously

instructed you about brandishing.

Those are the elements of the offenses. And as I say, you will have the instructions with you and you can go through them again as necessary as you think about each of the counts in the indictment. That concludes my opening part of my instructions. I'll have more to say later.

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CERTIFICATE I, Marcia G. Patrisso, RMR, CRR, Official Reporter of the United States District Court, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript constitutes, to the best of my skill and ability, a true and accurate transcription of my stenotype notes taken in the matter of Criminal Action No. 13-10200-GAO, United States of America v. Dzhokhar A. Tsarnaev. /s/ Marcia G. Patrisso MARCIA G. PATRISSO, RMR, CRR Official Court Reporter Date: 4/15/15